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Abstract
This article argues that the international community must learn from the genocide in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in order to prevent history from repeating itself. It highlights that firm action
must be taken to punish the perpetrators of genocide as soon as it is discovered and urges the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court. Next it exposes the weaknesses of the
ICTY in its inability to apprehend those that were indicted. Finally, it recommends measures that
individual nations should implement at a domestic level.
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Genocide shaped the founding of the United Nations. The
men and women who drafted our Charter did not yet know
the terror of possible nuclear holocaust. They did know of
the actual Holocaust of Jews and others perpetrated by the
Nazi regime. Indeed, the full revelation of that horror, in the
spring of 1945, formed the backdrop to the work of the San
Francisco Conference [that established the United Nations].
It gave added urgency to the task of building an institution
intended not only to preserve world peace but above all to
protect human dignity. Ensuring that genocide could never
be repeated became, in many people's eyes, the new world
Organization's most important mission.1
-Kofi Annan, Message on the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,2
(or "Genocide Convention") on
December 9, 1998.
We seem to agree that if genocide had not happened, there
would never have been a United Nations. Ipso facto, since there
is now a U.N. Organization, genocide should have ceased to oc-
cur. It did not. Unfortunately, the United Nations has not al-
ways been successful in its most important mission-ensuring
that genocide was not repeated.
My ancestors came to Bosnia from Spain at the end of the
fifteenth century, after the 1492 expulsions that sent a multi-
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1. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address Commemorating the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/
quotable/6822.htm> (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal).
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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tude-estimates vary from 50,000 to 250,000-of Spain's Jews
scattered in all directions.3 My father is a Holocaust survivor. I
was born two years after World War II ended, a life built upon
the ashes of the Holocaust. The Genocide Convention was
adopted by the United Nations as an instrument of international
law that would prevent genocide from happening ever again. I
was not supposed to witness genocide in my country. Yet, I did.
Although I do not wish to equate the genocide in Bosnia
and Herzegovina with the Holocaust, the sheer number of Bos-
nian civilians affected by atrocities committed during the 1992-
1995 war make the drawing of some parallels possible: over
200,000 people dead or missing, over 220,000 people wounded,
and over two million displaced people expelled from their
homes. Serb gunmen who surrounded Sarajevo, the country's
capital, for almost four years killed over 10,000 individuals, in-
cluding 1700 children. The majority of victims were Bosniaks or
Bosnian Muslims. The suffering of other ethnic communities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina notwithstanding, it was the Bosniaks
who were the target of what, by any accepted legal and moral
measure, can be termed genocide. We all well remember the
slaughter of Srebrenica in July 1995 when an estimated 8000
Bosniak men were killed by Serb nationalist militias that overran
this city while under the protection of the United Nations. The
killings, tortures, rapes, and deportations that occurred were
often carried out in a strikingly gruesome manner, on a scale not
seen in Europe since World War II. But what made the geno-
cide in Bosnia and Herzegovina so disturbing was not only its
gruesome nature, but also the fact that it was a practice that the
West believed it had put firmly behind, vowing that genocide
would happen "never again!"
How could anyone participate in, approve of, or ignore
such a human tragedy with the memory of the Holocaust etched
in people's minds and both the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights4 and the Genocide Convention adopted? It was the hesi-
tation of the international community to act in accordance with
the values and principles proclaimed in these and other interna-
3. HOWARD M. SACHAR, DIAsPoRA 229 (Harper & Row, 1985).
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, General Assembly
Resolution 217 A (III).
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tional conventions that entailed failure to prevent or halt the
genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later Rwanda.
In hesitating to apply the principles of international law es-
tablished in the aftermath of the World War II, the international
community perpetuated the sixteenth-century concept enunci-
ated by the maxim cuius regio eius religio,5 which was later ex-
pended, with the rise of the nation-state in Europe, to include
eius nacio.6 This situation led to the misinterpretation that the
Bosnian genocide (for which the Serbs first invented the euphe-
mism "ethnic cleansing," later regrettably accepted by general
public) was an unintentional and unfortunate by-product of civil
war. This statement was not so; rather, it was a rational choice
and the direct and planned consequence of conscious policy de-
cisions taken by those who are now being indicted by the Inter-
national War Crime Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia7 (or
"ICTY") in The Hague. But apart from the establishment of this
tribunal by the Security Council in 1993, there was little else the
great powers agreed to do to stop the war crimes from being
carried out in that part of the world.
In hindsight, it is clear that the world of the early and mid-
1990s was still the world in which the foreign policies of the
great powers were based principally on a calculation of political,
economic, and military interest. Though the major western pow-
ers could not summon the will to intervene on the behalf of the
victims of genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, their public con-
stantly reminded them, through protests and other expressions
of public discontent, that a foreign policy based solely on eco-
nomic and political interests would not be supported. The pub-
lic required a foreign policy that combined interests with values
protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Genocide Convention.
Thanks to the Internet and the omnipresence of the media,
ordinary people realized that there is no conflict in the modern
world that can be described as "a quarrel in a far away country
5. "Those who live in a country should adopt the religion of its ruler." This maxim
originally applied to the right of princes in the Holy Roman Empire to impose a reli-
gion on their subjects.
6. "Eius nacio" embodies the concept of a national religion.
7. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
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between people of whom we know nothing," as Neville Cham-
berlain said of Czechoslovakia in 1938.
Backed by the modern media, a host of nongovernmental
organizations, notably Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, and Doctors Without Borders started to advance the
principles of human rights in the international politics. The lat-
ter organization was just recently awarded the Nobel Prize for
Peace for its effort in that domain. As Karl Meyer rightly notes,
it was primarily due to these nongovernmental organizations
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the
United Nations in 1948, has assumed 'a robust second life' 8 in
the late 1990s. Due to pressure from those organizations, as well
as the general public, the international community finally real-
ized that it should change its support for the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention from de-
claratory to contractual.
Having learned from its experience in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina that the postponement of military intervention against "eth-
nic cleansing" can result only in more victims and greater expen-
diture for the international community, in 1999, the Western
powers opted for a robust and relatively fast and successful inter-
vention in Kosovo in order to stop the mass killing and expul-
sion of Kosovo's Albanian community by the Serbian military
and police. The North Atlantic Treaty Organziation's ("NATO")
intervention in Kosovo will go down in history as the first inter-
vention of the great powers that was not triggered by political or
economic concerns, but purely humanitarian interests.
Now that the world's collective conscience has finally
reached the point where human rights violations in every corner
of the Earth can generate global attention and, as in the cases of
Kosovo and East Timor, trigger intervention, it is time to speed
up the creation of a permanent international criminal court to
try crimes against humanity. Further building of the interna-
tional legal order based on universal human rights will be impos-
sible without an international criminal court. Ad hoc war crimes
tribunals like the International War Crimes Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia in The Hague have not been efficient enough in
preventing the war crimes and apprehending the war criminals.
8. See Karl E. Meyer, Enforcing Human Rights, WORLD POL'YJ., Oct. 1, 1999, at 45
cited in 1999 WL 17305202.
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May I remind you that two top political and military leaders of
Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, twice in-
dicted by the ICTY for genocide and crimes against humanity,
are still at large?
The main weakness of the ICTY-its inability to apprehend
those indicted due to the lack of constabulary-would most cer-
tainly continue to plague a permanent international criminal
court as well. That is why this court alone can never act as a
substitute for political and military intervention. In order to dis-
suade ethnic chauvinists from perpetrating ethnic cleansing of
other ethnic groups and using different forms of terror to
achieve their ends, there is the need for an overwhelming mili-
tary force in the hands of the international community. As the
cases in Bosnia and Kosovo clearly show, neither U.N. resolu-
tions and declarations, nor the Genocide Convention mean any-
thing in the absence of the unrelenting threat of force by a su-
perpower determined to stop aggression and genocide. Only
force combined with convictions makes a powerful weapon for
keeping modern forms of barbarism in check and secure that
those who commit crimes against humanity will not go unpun-
ished. This powerful combination also makes sure that historical
truth has been established, preventing distortion and falsifica-
tion of historical facts.
For example, myths about Chetniks (Serbian nationalist mi-
litias during World War II) as "foes of the Nazis, Fascists and
Communists," harbored by the West for years, enabled men like
Momcilo Djujic to live openly in the United States for fifty years9
despite the fact that the government of Communist Yugoslavia
asked for his extradition based on charges of crimes against civil-
ians and allegations of his collaboration with fascists during the
World War II. Little did the West want to know about the role
Djujic played as a 'godfather' to Serbian ultranationalist politi-
cian and the founder of the Serbian Radical Party, Vojislav
Seselj, whose paramilitary group committed numerous atrocities
against civilians during the aggressions against Croatia and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, and who later became a senior member of
Milosevic's government.
On May 22, 1999, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic fi-
9. Benjamin Wittes, For an Accused War Criminal, A 50-Year Haven in America, WASH.
POST, September 20, 1999 at A15.
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nally became the first sitting head of state in history to be in-
dicted by an international tribunal for committing war crimes
and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. The indictment was ac-
companied by an international arrest warrant. Even though the
international community has shown no sign of any real effort to
bring Milosevic to trial, there is no doubt that he will eventually
face it. Effective political and military intervention in Kosovo has
already proved to Milosevic and others that they cannot hide
their crimes against humanity behind the sanctity of state sover-
eignty.
True, the diffusion of global human rights consciousness
has not managed to halt the horror of human rights violations in
Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and now Chechnya. The existence
of war crime tribunals has offered no guarantees that the perpe-
trators would be brought promptly to justice. Still, no one can
deny that an international order, based on universal human
rights norms and international laws, has already begun to
emerge. The most recent proof of this system's undeniable
existence is the arrest of Chilean general Augusto Pinochet in
Britain and the arrest of Vichy's minister Maurice Papon in Swit-
zerland. These arrests exemplify that the apprehension of per-
sons indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, never
falls under a statute of limitations. They also enable us to pre-
dict with greater certainty that genocide, the most horrifying
human practice of this millennium, will indeed never again hap-
pen in the next one.
If genocide and crimes against humanity can still happen
on the threshold of the twenty-first century and countries can
harbor war criminals in order to escape justice, then we must ask
ourselves what we should do to ensure that "never again" really
means never again. Anticipation and prevention of horrible
events can move the world in that direction. Experience gained
in the course of the bloody conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina
could lead to the development of a realistic and manageable
strategy to prevent and respond to mass atrocities; the more
timely and effective response to atrocities in Kosovo offers strong
proof of this strategy. We need, therefore, to establish national
frameworks for early warnings, mitigation, and the curtailing of
campaigns of atrocities inside any state. As we have seen, seem-
ingly minor or small-scale atrocities can evolve into broader,
bloodier campaigns. In Yugoslavia in 1989, the regime in Bel-
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grade revoked the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and then
launched threats and other pressures, including atrocities. In
1991, it attacked Slovenia and Croatia. These actions were fol-
lowed by aggression and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and then with the full-scale aggression and genocide against Ko-
sovo last year.
There should be no excuses of so-called pragmatism or real-
politik. The moment that the causes and perpetrator regimes or
groups have been identified, firm action must be taken.
